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ASLEEP AT THE WHEEL OF AUTO SAFETY?
RECENT AIR BAG REGULATIONS BY THE
NATIONAL HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY
ADMINISTRATION
In 1991, Congress enacted the Intermodel Surface Transportation and
Efficiency Act' (ISTEA) which directed the National Highway Traffic
Safety Administration (NHTSA or the Agency) to implement air bag
regulations.2 During congressional hearings on the proposed directive,
domestic auto makers failed to disclose that driver air bags were respon-
sible for the deaths of five drivers.3 Unaware that air bags posed any
safety problems, Congress required NHTSA to mandate air bags in all
new automobiles. NHTSA, under this legislative directive, issued rules
in 1993 mandating that all new cars and light trucks have dual-side air
bags by the 1998 and 1999 model years.
4
But before the ink was even dry on NHTSA's air bag mandate, news
of air bag-related deaths began filtering back to Washingtoni Just
1. ,See Intermodel Surface Transportation and Efficiency Act of 1991, Pub. L.
No. 102-240, 105 Stat. 1914 (codified as amended at 49 U.S.C. § 30102 (1994)).
2. In 1966, Congress passed the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety
Act which directs the Secretary of Transportation to develop and issue motor vehi-
cle safety standards. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1391-1392 (1992). The National Highway
Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA), formerly named the National Highway
Safety Board (NHSB), was created after the passage of this Act to promulgate auto
safety standards. See 49 C.F.R. § 1.50(a) (1997).
3. See Air Bag Safety: Hearings on FMVSS 208 before the Senate Comm. on
Commerce, Science and Transportation, 101 st Cong. (Oct. 8, 1991) (convening the
nation's three largest auto manufacturers, General Motors (GM), Ford, and Chrys-
ler to a hearing on the proposed air bag mandate). The information on both driver-
side air bag fatalities known, and significant risks of injury or death to children,
was not revealed at the hearing. See PARENTS FOR SAFER AIR BAGS, THE AIR BAG
CRISIS CAUSES AND SOLUTIONS 1, 31 (1997) [hereinafter THE AIR BAG CRISIS].
4. See Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards; Occupant Crash Protection,
58 Fed. Reg. 46,551 (1993) (codified at 49 C.F.R. § 571.208 (1996)). The "model
year" refers to cars manufactured on or after September 1, 1997. See id
5. See NATIONAL CENTER FOR STATISTICS & ANALYSIS, U.S. DEP'T OF
TRANSP., SPECIAL CRASH INVESTIGATION REPORT (Jan. 1999) (revealing that
NHTSA investigated its first fatal crash involving a child who was killed by an air
bag on April 4, 1993); U.S. NEWS STORY PAGE, Government Makes it Official: Air
Bags Can Kill Children (visited Feb. 18, 1999) <http://cnn.com/US/9610
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months after the 1993 mandate went into effect, requiring air bags in
every new vehicle, NHTSA was forced to address an apparent crisis in
auto safety.6
Although mandating air bags was intended to save lives, the'NHTSA
reports that 125 vehicle occupants have been killed by air bags.7 The
vast majority of air bag-related deaths occur in collisions where the ve-
hicles are travelling at less than fifteen miles per hour (mph). Even
more disturbing, NHTSA acknowledges that in each of these cases the
occupant would have survived if the air bag did not deploy.8 Intensify-
ing this problem, the number of cars sold containing air bags on both the
driver and passenger side continues to grow.9 Meanwhile, millions of
air bag-equipped vehicles, already on the road, 0 are killing and seri-
ously injuring children" and short-statured adults.
12
/23/airbag.safe/index.html> (citing a report released on October 23, 1996 by
NHTSA ruling for the first time that an air bag killed a properly restrained, five
year old child who was seated in the front of her family's car).
6. The Intermodel Surface Transportation and Efficiency Act of 1991, Pub. L.
No. 102-240, 105 Stat. 1914 (codified as amended at 49 U.S.C. § 30102 (1991))
(requiring that 95% of vehicles have dual-side air bags by 1996, and by 1997, in-
stallation would occur in the remaining five percent of vehicles).
7. See NATIONAL CENTER FOR STATISTICS & ANALYSIS, supra note 5. These
statistics include 56 adults, both drivers and passengers, and 69 children. In addi-
tion, a total of 39 more unconfirmed air bag fatality cases are pending at the
Agency. See id.; see also Lori Tripoli, Air Bag Deployment: A Call to Action to
Protect Children, LEADER'S PROD. LIAB. L. & STRATEGY, Nov. 1995, at 6 (dis-
cussing the negative side effects associated with air bag deployment).
8. See Air Bag On-Off Switches, 62 Fed. Reg. 62,406, 62,409 (1997) (to be
codified at 49 C.F.R. pts. 571 & 595). "NHTSA believes that none of these occu-
pants would have died if they had not been seated in front of an air bag." Id. at
62,409.
9. Dual-side air bags means that the automobile contains both driver-side and
front passenger-side air bags, which were mandated in all new cars in 1991. Be-
fore this statute went into effect, many cars were sold with only driver-side air
bags. See THE AIR BAG CRISIS, supra note 3, at I.
10. During the model years 1989 through 1996, automobile manufacturers
installed 56 million driver air bags and 27 million passenger air bags. See John D.
Graham et al., The Cost-Effectiveness of Air Bags by Seating Position, 278 JAMA
1418, 1418 (1997).
11. See, e.g., Elisa R. Braver et al., Reductions in Deaths in Frontal Crashes
Among Right Front Passengers in Vehicles Equipped With Passenger Air Bags,
278 JAMA 1437, 1439 (1997) (concluding that although passenger air bags reduce
the risk of death in frontal crashes for right front adult passengers, air bags kill
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Air bags 13 were touted as life-saving devices in the 1980s,,14 and
NHTSA estimates that air bags have indeed saved 3,808 lives.'5  Yet
alarmingly, a deploying air bag kills one child for every ten adult pas-
sengers it saves. 16 Further, adult drivers and passengers are not immune
more children than they save); Air Bag Decapitates Baby in Minor Wreck, ST.
Louis POST-DISPATCH, Nov. 28, 1996, at 18A (describing fender-bender in which
a one-year-old girl was killed when the Volkswagen Jetta's passenger-side air bag
deployed into the child's forward-facing safety seat); Death of Fetus Blamed on
Car's Air Bag, THE ASSOCIATED PRESS, Oct. 29, 1996, available in 1996 WL
4446513 (reporting that NHTSA concluded air bag deployment caused the death of
a thirty-five-week old fetus where the mother had only sustained bruises in a low-
speed crash); John C. Ensslin, Air Bag Inflates, Injures Infant in Two-Car Crash,
ROCKY MOUNTAIN NEWS, Nov. 17, 1995, at 36A (writing that a three-month-old
seated in the front suffered a skull fracture from a deploying air bag); Girl Killed by
Air Bag Was Properly Belted, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 24, 1996, at D2 (reporting that for
the first time, NHTSA found that air bag inflation killed a five-year-old girl who
was wearing a seat belt properly); Dealer, GM Sued After Air Bag Death, Boy, 2,
Decapitated During Christmas Lights Tour, FORT WORTH STAR-TELEGRAM, Jan.
2, 1997, at B2 (detailing a lawsuit filed against a car dealer and General Motors
Company after a child was decapitated by air bag deployment); Robert C. Sanders,
Air Bags Can Kill Kids, WASH. POST, Oct. 23, 1996, at A23 (editorial alerting the
public of the risks to children by air bags by author whose child was killed in a
low-speed crash from air bag deployment).
12. See Cindy Skrzycki, Crash Test Raises New Concerns on Older Air Bags,
WASH. POST, Mar. 2, 1999, at El (reporting that a NHTSA study revealed air bags
are dangerous to small women); Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards; Occupant
Crash Protection, 62 Fed. Reg. 807, 808 (1997) (to be codified at 49 C.F.R. pt. 571)
("A majority of the fatally injured drivers were short-statured women who moved
the driver's seat forward.").
13. Air bags are made of nylon and sealed into the dashboard (passenger-side
air bags) or the center of a car's steering wheel (driver-side air bags). Crash sen-
sors at the front of the vehicle signal the ignition of sodium azide, which triggers an
explosive charge of nitrogen gas into the bags. See THE AIR BAG CRISIS, supra
note 3, at xiv. The bags deploy in 0.05 seconds at speeds between 90 and 211
miles per hour with a force of up to 2,600 pounds per square inch. See U.S. DEP'T
OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., 45 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY REP. 1073,
1074 (1996); Don Sherman, Blink of an Eye, MOTOR TREND, May 1993, at 81, 82.
14. See generally Ben Kelly, GM and the Air Bag: A Decade of Delay, 35 BUS.
& Soc'Y REv. 54 (Fall 1980) (chronicling the actions taken by General Motors in
its delay in introducing air bags). The senior vice-president of the Insurance Insti-
tute for Highway Safety asserts the life-saving nature of air bags and decries GM
for "pursuing a policy of withholding technology from the public." Id
15. See NATIONAL CENTER FOR STATISTICS & ANALYSIS, supra note 5.
16. See Graham et al., supra note 10, at 1424. ("One can question whether it is
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from the risk posed by these safety devices. While air bag deployments
on the passenger side have largely been responsible for child fatalities,
they have also taken the lives of adults.' 7 In addition, driver-side air
bags have caused the deaths of fifty-one adults nationwide.1
8
The rising air bag death toll has prompted a host of responses from
consumer groups, 19 auto manufacturers, 20 government agencies, 21 Con-
appropriate to maintain a mandatory policy that causes a net increase in mortality
risk to children.... We are aware of no other mandatory health measure in the
United States with a benefit-risk ratio so close to 1.").
17. See NATIONAL CENTER FOR STATISTICS & ANALYSIS, supra note 5 (con-
firming that five adult passenger deaths occurred because of air bag deployment
while three more adult passenger deaths are currently being investigated).
18. See id. (estimating that an additional 12 cases of adult driver air bag deaths
are pending).
19. See Warren Brown, Consumers Should Get Air Bag Data, Groups Say,
WASH. POST, Feb. 12, 1998, at A9; U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS.,
supra note 13, at 1073.
Professional organizations such as the American Academy of Pedi-
atrics, Air Bag Safety Campaign, National Safety Council, Brain
Injury Association, National Association of Children's Hospitals,
National Association of Governors Highway Safety Representatives,
and Related Institutions teamed together with the Centers for Dis-
ease Prevention and Control and the National Transportation Safety
Board to study the Special Crash Investigation data maintained by
NHTSA, pertaining to child air bag fatalities.
Id.
20. See US. Classrooms to Receive Unique Air Bag Safety Course, PR
NEWSWIRE, 1 (Dec. 13, 1996). Chrysler Corporation, the American Automobile
Association, and the American Academy of Pediatrics began a public education
campaign on December 13, 1996 titled, "ABC's of Air Bag Safety - The Back Is
Where It's At." See id. The program is structured to teach children important pre-
cautions to undertake when riding in air bag-equipped vehicles. See id. See also
US. Insurers Launch Air Bag Safety Mailing Campaign, AP - Dow JONES INT'L
NEWS, 1 (Nov. 18, 1996).
21. See NAT'L HIGHWAY TRANSP. SAFETY ADMIN., U.S. DEP'T OF TRANSP.,
THIRD REPORT TO CONGRESS, EFFECTIVENESS OF OCCUPANT PROTECTION
SYSTEMS AND THEIR USE 1 (Dec. 1996) [hereinafter THIRD REPORT TO CONGRESS].
On May 21, 1996, the Department of Transportation formed the National Automo-
tive Occupant Protection Campaign. See id at 29. A coalition comprising con-
sumer safety organizations, insurance groups, air bag manufacturers, members of
the auto industry, and the federal government pledged ten million dollars toward
the campaign to prevent injuries and fatalities. See id at 31-32; THE AIR BAG
CRISIS, supra note 3, at 39. The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB), in
an effort to advise auto manufacturers of investigated child air bag deaths, issued a
safety recommendation in October 1995, urging auto makers to accomplish two
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gress, 22 and the President,23 all aimed at alerting the public to this na-
tional safety problem. The death toll has also prompted NHTSA to initi-
ate a series of rulemakings to address the crisis. These NHTSA rule-
makings attempt to address the harmful risks posed to vehicle
occupants.2 Certain air bag systems 25 installed in vehicles in the United
States can be fatal to those occupants who are too close to the air bag at
the time of deployment. Generally, these include short-statured adult
passengers, drivers, 26 and children. 7 These occupants, known as out-of-
things. First, the NTSB wanted enhanced warning labels in vehicles to warn occu-
pants of air bag risks. See id. Second, the agency was recommending notification
letters to consumers who had already purchased cars with dangerous air bags. See
id.
22. See Air Bag Safety: Hearings on FMVSS 208 before the Senate Comm. on
Commerce, Science and Transportation, 105th Cong. (Jan. 9, 1997) (soliciting
testimony from various safety officials and consumer groups to testify on the
NHTSA air bag safety standards). Following a tragic low-speed collision that de-
capitated a one-year-old in Idaho, Senator Dirk Kempthorne, (R-ID), petitioned
NHTSA for a moratorium on testing with unbelted dummies. See Federal Motor
Vehicle Safety Standards; Occupant Crash Protection, 62 Fed. Reg. 8,917 (1997)
(to be codified at 49 C.F.R. pt. 571). See also John Mintz, NHTSA's Air Bag Stan-
dards Assailed; Hill Republicans Seek to End Rules Because of Dangers to Chil-
dren, WASH. POST, Jan. 9, 1997, at E3.
23. See Peter Baker, While Reassuring Public, Clinton Lobbies for Improved
Air Bag Safety, WASH. POST, Dec. 29, 1996, at A6.
24. See THIRD REPORT TO CONGRESS, supra note 21, at 29-30. The risk of
adverse effects from air bags primarily relate to occupants who are in the zone of
deployment at the time of inflation. See id
25. The National Highway Traffic Safety Administration describes these sys-
tems as consisting of three components:EA]n air bag module, crash sensor, and a diagnostic unit. The air
ag module, containing an inflator and a . . .lightweight fabric air
bag, is located in the hub of the steering wheel .... Crash sensor(s)
[are] located on the front of the vehicle [and] . . . measure [the] de-
celeration [of the vehicle]. [T]hese sensors, [upon] detectjing]
[rapid car] decelerations ... send an electronic signal to the inflator
to trigger or deploy the bag. The diagnostic unit is an electronic
device that monitors the operational readiness of the air bag system.
Id at2.
26. Of the 51 adult drivers who have been killed, 18 were short-statured
women, 5'4" or under, who tend to sit closer to the steering wheel. See NATIONAL
CENTER FOR STATISTICS & ANALYSIS, supra note 5. Thirty-two of the adults were
not using their seat belt, while fifteen drivers were belted properly at the time of
death. See id
27. See, e.g., U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., supra note 13, at
1074-75 (citing six reasons why children in the front seat are more likely to be
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position passengers, are the highest at-risk category group for air bag
deaths.28
Air bags inflate in a fraction of a second, more quickly than the blink
of an eye, and are designed to protect an unbelted adult male ina severe
frontal crash. 29 The energy required to deploy the cushion for adults,
however, can prove fatal or injurious for children in low-speed colli-
improperly positioned and at increased risk of death or serious injury from air bag
deployment).
First, children are more likely to move around or lean forward ....
Second, because of the positioning of forward-facing child re-
straints, children who are properly buckled into such restraints are
several inches closer to the intense forces of air bag deployment.
Third, because children's feet usually do not touch t e oor, they
cannot brace themselves on the floor during precrash braking.
Fourth, children too small to have the shoulder [or lap] belt fit prop-
erly ... may place the shoulder belt under their arm or behind their
back, allowing their upper torso to move forward into the deploying
air bag during pre-crash braking. Fifth, because most children are
shorter than adults, a child's neck and head are more likely to con-
tact the deploying air bag . . . . Finally, a rear-facing child-safety
seat cannot be positioned- far enough from the air bag to eliminate
any risk of serious or fatal injury.
Id. See also Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards; Occupant Crash Protection,
62 Fed. Reg. 807, 808 (1997):
Most child fatalities attributed to an air bag fall into one of two
groups: (1) infants riding in rear-facing infant seats, thus placing
them very close to the air-bag at the time of deployment, or (2) older
children.. without any type of restraint ... allowing them to slide
forward during pre-crash braking ....
Id. at 808.
28. See U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., supra note 13, at 1074-75.
See, e.g., Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards; Occupant Crash Protection, 62
Fed. Reg. 807, 813 (discussing the Agency's criteria for smart air bags). The
Agency states, "[T]he two groups of children that experience has shown to be at
special risk from air bags: infants in rear-facing child seats, and children who are
out-of-position (because they are unbelted or improperly belted) when the air bag
deploys." Id. See, e.g., Graham et al., supra note 10, at 1418 ("The energy pro-
duced by the rapidly deploying air bag has the potential to injure someone whose
hands, arms, chest, head or face are in the path of the air bag while it deploys."); 62
Fed. Reg. at 808 ("The sudden release of energy by an inflating air bag can harm
some front seat occupants, particularly if they are too close to the air bag at the
time of deployment.").
29. In keeping with the minimum requirements of the crash test standard, many
auto makers built their air bags to protect an adult male. See Graham et al., supra
note 10, at 1424 ("In addition, U.S. air bag systems were optimized to protect an
unbelted 76.5-kg adult male.. ").
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sions. ° Twenty-two infants restrained in rear-facing child safety seats
were seriously injured or killed by front-passenger air bags in these low-
speed collisions. 3' The injuries were caused by the positioning of the
safety seats, which place the infant's head in close proximity to the air
bag that deploys at rates of up to 200 miles per hour, causing massive
head trauma.32 Of the sixty-nine children who have sustained fatal inju-
ries, forty-four were unbelted.33 As a result of braking before impact,
called pre-crash braking, children are thrust forward into the area of de-
ployment and suffer broken necks and other severe injuries from the
explosive force of air bag inflation.
34
30. See THE AIR BAG CRISIS, supra note 3, at xv, xvi (describing the injuries
sustained to children during air bag deployment). There are three kinds of air bag
blows that inflict injuries upon children. These blows are labeled "punch out,"
"catapult," and "bag slap." Id Each distinct blow can harm children in different
ways:
Punch out occurs when the child's head is near the dash and is
struck by the bag in the first 20 milliseconds of deployment as it
bursts through its plastic cover on the dash .... Catapult injuries
.* [are sustained] when the inflating bag envelops a forward posi-
tioned child and, as it rapidly reaches peak deployment, drives the
child's head upwards and backwards. Ironically . . . when [a] child
is restrained ... [t]he lap belt holds the child's body down while the
bag accelerates rapidly under the child's chin driving the head up-
ward and backward with tremendous force. 'Bag slap injuries occur
when the bag whips out at the occupant at the moment of peak ex-
cursion, before it draws back into its fully inflated shape. The for-
ward tip of the bag lashes out and snaps at the occupant [usually]
caus[ing] serious eye injuries.
Id. at xvi.
31. See NATIONAL CENTER FOR STATISTIC & ANALYSIS, supra note 5. The
crash scenario for fatalities to infants in rear-facing seats is:
Upon impact, the deploying . . . air bag interacts violently with the
back of the rear-facing infant seat, typically with sufficient force to
crack or break the plastic shell. The force and rapid acceleration of
this impact are carried through the seat and into the child's head
causing skull fractures and associated brain injuries.
THIRD REPORT TO CONGRESS, supra note 21, at 30.
32. See CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, Update: Fatal Air
Bag-Related Injuries to Children, 277 JAMA 11 (Jan. 1, 1997) ("Air bags deploy
within 0.05 seconds at velocities of 140-200 miles per hour...").
33. See NATIONAL CENTER FOR STATISTICS & ANALYSIS, supra note 5.
34. See THIRD REPORT TO CONGRESS, supra note 21, at 30 (describing in grue-
some detail the manner in which children suffer fatal injuries from air bags).
[T]he air bag deploys into the out-of-position child's chest, neck,
and face. As the air bag expands, it results in the rapid translation
and rotation of the child's skull, causing a number of injuries.
These include fractures of the cervical spine, bruising and laceration
of the spinal cord, and brain stem injuries . . . Mandibular (jaw
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Adult injuries and deaths in driver and passenger seats occur in a
similar fashion." Shorter drivers generally sit close to the steering
wheel, the place of deployment.36  Of the fifty-one adult fatalities,
twenty were women under five feet, two inches in height.37 These sta-
tistics highlight a common risk factor for air bag-related fatalities and
injuries: the out-of-position occupant, sitting close to the bag during
inflation, is at risk.
Regulatory agencies and auto manufacturers now confront two loom-
ing questions, whether these deaths are the direct result of the air bag
mandate, and could they have been prevented? The cause of this crisis
is widely disputed. The auto industry points to government regulations
mandating the installation of dual-side air bags in every vehicle. Con-
sumer groups, on the other hand, blame the dangerous air bag design
systems that some auto makers install in vehicles, despite industry
awareness that children and adults may be seriously harmed, or even
killed.39 In addition, some Congressional members argue that the gov-
ernment-imposed crash test standards, which include optimizing air bag
systems to protect an unbelted adult male,40 should be suspended until
bone) fractures and avulsed (knocked-out) teeth have also been re-
ported as a result of air bag or cover flap impact with the chin and
face .... [Ilnjuries to the lungs and heart have [also] been reported.
Id
35. See, e.g., Fisher v. Ford Motor Co., No. 3:97 CV 7070, 1998 WL 427559
(N.D. Ohio June 29, 1998) (describing the injuries suffered by a woman alleging
that the force of her driver-side air bag, on impact, gave her a skull fracture, brain
hemorrhage, broken arm, and a bruised knee).
36. See supra text accompanying note 26.
37. See NATIONAL CENTER FOR STATISTICS & ANALYSIS, supra note 5.
38. Telephone Interview with Kyle Johnson, Attorney for General Motors
(Nov. 5, 1997). "We knew that these [airbags] would cause harm to children... [It
was] a known quantity when [the] law was originally written . .. [and] should be
no surprise." Id.
39. See The Air Bags are Coming, CONSUMERS' RES., May 1980, at 15, 16
(reporting on consumer and insurance group opposition to the Agency's push for
air bags as a form of passive restraint due to concerns on the effectiveness of air
bags); Kelly, supra note 14, at 58 (reporting that in October 1979, GM warned
there were concerns over possible injuries to out-of-position children); see discus-
sion infra Part I (describing domestic auto makers' testing that revealed certain air
bags were dangerous to children sitting close to the bag); THE AIR BAG CRISIS,
supra note 3, at 29 (revealing that General Motors and Mercedes had successfully
developed dual stage deployment air bags that would increase safety for children).
40. See discussion infra Parts II.B. I. & II.B.2.
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the crisis is resolved.4' In response, NHTSA announced on August 6,
1996, an array of proposed rulemaking actions, termed a comprehensive
strategy, to address air bag fatalities.42
As of 1999, the final rules include: requiring placement of enhanced
sun visor warning labels in cars, alerting consumers to the dangers asso-
ciated with air bags; 43 permitting auto manufacturers to depower air bags
so they deploy at a less forceful rate; 44 and allowing car owners to deac-
tivate either driver or passenger-side air bags if they petition NHTSA for
such action.45 Other rulemaking measures extend the time period in
which auto manufacturers can offer manual cut-off switches, 46 and re-
quest comments regarding a possible moratorium on testing with un-
belted dummies. 7 Most recently, NHTSA proposed a rule which would
41. See Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards; Occupant Crash Protection,
62 Fed. Reg. 8,917 (1997) (to be codified at 49 C.F.R. pt. 571) (petitioning
NHTSA to impose a moratorium on testing with unbelted dummies); see also Fed-
eral Motor Vehicle Safety Standards; Occupant Crash Protection, 62 Fed. Reg.
15,453 (1997) (extending the comment period on this petition to June 2, 1997).
42. In August 1996, the Agency proposed several Notices of Proposed Rule-
making (NPRM) aimed at reducing the adverse effects of air bags. See 61 Fed.
Reg. 40,784 (1996) (to be codified at 49 C.F.R. pt. 571) (outlining the Agency's
proposals to possibly mandate smart passenger air bags, require new warning label
requirements, and mandate a manual cut-off switch option).
43. See Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards; Occupant Crash Protection,
61 Fed. Reg. 60,206 (1996) (to be codified at 49 C.F.R. pt. 571) (requiring new
attention-getting labels warning vehicle owners of inherent, serious risks of placing
children in the front seat).
44. See Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards; Occupant Crash Protection,
62 Fed. Reg. 12,960 (1997) (to be codified at 49 C.F.R. pt. 571) (amending the
FMVSS 208 standard temporarily to allow vehicle manufacturers to depower air
bags to inflate at a slower rate).
45. See Air Bag On-Off Switches, 62 Fed. Reg. 62,406 (1997) (to be codified
at 49 C.F.R. pts. 571 and 595) (allowing auto dealers and repair businesses to in-
stall manual on-off switches for any vehicle owner who requests it).
46. See Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards; Occupant Crash Protection,
62 Fed. Reg. 798 (1997) (to be codified at 49 C.F.R. pt. 571) (continuing through
the year 2000 to allow the use of on-off switches in vehicles without a rear seat to
protect children).
47. See Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards; Occupant Crash Protection,
62 Fed. Reg. 8,917 (1997) (to be codified at 49 C.F.R. pt. 571). Testing with un-
belted dummies would mean more force is needed to protect the unbelted occupant,
thereby increasing the power of the air bag deployment. See id. In contrast, testing
on a belted occupant would depower the force of the air bag because less force is
needed to restrain the occupant from hitting the car's interior when a seat belt is
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require advanced air bags in all vehicles and light trucks by the year
2005.48 A final rule is expected by the end of 1999. Whether these
measures will translate into effective remedies for the air bag crisis re-
mains to be seen. What is certain is that several triggering events, oc-
curring from the 1970s throughout the 1990s, needlessly provoked and
aggravated the crisis.
Four predominant factors have contributed to the escalation of air bag
fatalities. First, although air bag researchers documented deadly risks
associated with certain types of air bag systems in the 1970s, many un-
safe systems were installed into automobiles in the United States in the
1980s. 49 Second, crash test standards developed by NHTSA, to which
all air bag restraint systems must conform, required that air bag deploy-
ment occur at a rate of force sufficient to protect an unbelted adult
male.5 In efforts to comply with the standard's minimum requirements,
auto manufacturers failed to test air bags on female or child-size dum-
mies.5" Third, the 1991 mandate from Congress, requiring both driver
and passenger-side air bags in all new vehicles, increased the number of
unsafe air bag systems on the roads. Fourth, the recent NHTSA rule-
makings, intended to combat the fatal risks posed by air bags, have been
largely inadequate in resolving the crisis.
52
Part I of this Note provides an overview of the complex legislative
history of the passive restraint rule. Particular focus is given to the de-
velopment of air bag systems and their delayed introduction into the
utilized. See id.
48. See Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards; Occupant Crash Protection,
63 Fed. Reg. 49,958 (1998) (to be codified at49 C.F.R. pts. 571, 585, 587, & 595).
49. See discussion infra Part I (outlining the history of air bag design and its
introduction on the market).
50. See discussion infra Parts II.B., II.C. (discussing depowering the force of
air bag deployments by changing the standard).
51. See Joint Petition submitted to NHTSA on March 12, 1998, by Consumer
Federation of America, Parents for Safer Air Bags, and Public Citizen, to upgrade
the federal air bag performance requirements to include: 1) barrier crash tests, 2) a
"family of dummies" with 5th percentile female dummies and child dummies, 3)
belted and unbelted dummies, 4) dummies in upright and leaning forward posi-
tions, and 5) cars traveling at 15 mph and 30 mph (on file with author). See Skrzy-
cki, supra note 12, at El I (describing that while the 5th percentile female dummy
is only about 108 lbs. and 4'11" tall, the 50th percentile male dummies, currently
used to test air bags, are 165 lbs. and 5'9" in height).
52. See discussion infra Part II (discussing the inadequacies in the recent
NHTSA rulemakings).
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domestic market. Part II provides a summary of NHTSA regulatory
actions taken in response to air bag deaths, as well as an assessment of
the impact of each rule. An analysis of the policy concerns raised by the
issuance of these rules follows. Finally, Part III summarizes the benefits
and disadvantages vehicle occupants can expect from the recent rules.
This Note concludes that in order to avoid further air bag fatalities,
NHTSA must pursue three goals: 1) mandate safer air bag design sys-
tems which certain auto companies currently use; 2) require notification
to vehicle owners with potentially unsafe air bag systems; and 3) initiate
the introduction of "smart" air bag53 technology. Beyond the scope of
this Note is the mounting wave of lawsuits concerning car manufactur-
ers' liability and preemption issues in air bag-related cases.54
I. THE HISTORY OF THE FEDERAL MOTOR VEHICLE SAFETY
STANDARD 208 AND EARLY AIR BAG DESIGN SYSTEMS
The Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard No. 208 (FMVSS 208)"
53. See Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards; Occupant Crash Protection,
62 Fed. Reg. 806, 813 (1997) ("The Agency's criteria for smart passenger air bags
includes any design system that automatically prevents an air bag from injuring the
two groups of children that are at increased risk of air bag injuries or deaths: infants
in rear-facing child seats, and children who are either unbelted or improperly belted
when the air bag deploys, rendering them out-of-position.").
54. See Crespo v. Chrysler Corp., No. 97 Civ. 8246, 1998 WL 542304
(S.D.N.Y. Aug. 25, 1998); In re Air Bag Products Liability Litigation, No. Civ. A.
MDL 1181, 1998 WL 279237 (E.D. La. May 21, 1998); see also Daimler Loses
$54.8MSuit, Automaker Ordered to Pay 75, 000 Car Owners in Airbag Safety Law-
suit (visited Feb. 18, 1999) <http://cnnfn.com/quickenonfn/homeauto/9902/18/
chrysler/>; Jury Finds Chrysler Liable for Child's Air Bag Death (visited Feb. 18,
1999) <http://www.cnn.com/US/9812/04/air.bag.verdict/index.html> (reporting a
federal jury award in New York of $750,000 to the family of a child killed by an air
bag). See generally Patrick J. Norton, Note, What Happens When Air Bags Kill:
Automobile Manufacturers' Liability For Injuries Caused by Air Bags, 48 CASE W.
RES. L. REv. 659 (1998) (discussing federal preemption issues relating to products
liability lawsuits involving air bags); Dana P. Babb, The Deployment of Car
Manufacturers Into a Sea of Product Liability? Recharacterizing Preemption as a
Federal Regulatory Compliance Defense in Airbag Litigation, 75 WASH U. L. Q.
1677 (1997) (evaluating whether state common law suits are barred due to auto
manufacturers compliance with federal air bag standards).
55. See 49 C.F.R. pt. 571.208 (1989); Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State
Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 24, 28 (1983) (describing the complex his-
tory of FMVSS 208); Ellen L. Theroff, Preemption ofAirbag Litigation: Just a Lot
of Hot Air?, 76 VA. L. REv. 577, 584 n.37 (1990) (outlining the regulatory life of
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has one of the most contentious and prolonged legislative histories in
administrative law. 56 Its inception thirty-one years ago marked the first
federal requirement that auto manufacturers install seat belts in all new
cars. 57 In the late 1960s, due to the nation's appallingly low seat-belt
use rate, coupled with a growing number of highway fatalities, NHTSA
introduced "passive restraint systems,,
58 to an unwilling industry.
59
The first patent for a prototype air bag was issued in 1953 to alretired
industrial engineering technician named John Hetrick. 60  Auto manu-
facturers, such as General Motors (GM) and Ford, also began experi-
menting with air bag design systems during this decade.6' It was not
until 1969, however, that the Department of Transportation (DOT) de-
cided to set a standard requiring all vehicles to be equipped with some
62 taform of passive restraint. Yet that same year, GM warned federal
safety officials that, according to the results of its testing, children sit-
ting in close proximity to an inflating air bag could be severely injured
FMVSS 208). For an excellent and thorough review of the earlier stages of this
statute, see JOHN D. GRAHAM, AUTO SAFETY: ASSESSING AMERICA'S
PERFORMANCE (1989).
56. See GRAHAM, supra note 55, at 235-37; Kurt B. Chadwell, Automobile
Passive Restraint Claims Post-Cipollone: An End to Federal Preemption Defense,
46 BAYLOR L. REV. 141, 144-45 (1994).
57. See 32 Fed. Reg. 2,415, 2,416 (1967).
58. Passive restraint means that no independent action by the occupants is
necessary in order for the safety restraint to function. See 58 Fed. Reg. 46,552
(1993) (to be codified at 49 C.F.R. § 571.208) (describing that such systems "pro-
tect their occupants by means that require no action.. ."). The government wanted
"nets that would envelop the occupant," cushioned interiors and dashboards, as
well as motorized seat belts. See THE AIR BAG CRISIS, supra note 3, at 2.
59. When the first passive restraint rule was issued by NHTSA in 1970, the
Agency received dozens of petitions for reconsideration from the auto industry.
See 36 Fed. Reg. 4,600 (1971). Petitions were filed from the following auto mak-
ers: Japan Automobile Manufacturers Association, Inc.; Peugeot, Inc.; American
Motors Corp.; Volvo, Inc.; Ford Motor Co.; Chrysler; Chrysler United Kingdom
Ltd.; Automobile Manufacturers Association; General Motors Corp.; Volkswagen
of America, Inc.; Takata Kojyo Co., Ltd.; Renault, Inc.; American Motors (Jeep);
Rolls-Royce, Ltd.; Checker Motors Corp.; and Eaton, Yale and Towne. See id;
see also, Sherman, supra note 13, at 83 ("The auto industry insisted the technology
was expensive, immature, and unwanted by consumers.").
60. See Sherman, supra note 13, at 81.
61. See GRAHAM, supra note 55, at 37-39.
62. See 34 Fed. Reg. 11,148 (1969).
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or killed.63
Despite concerns over safety risks posed by air bags and criticism
from the auto industry, NHTSA amended FMVSS 208 in 1970 to require
the installation of passive restraints.64 With this amendment, the Agency
sought to specify requirements for all passive occupant crash protection
systems.6' Two obstacles, however, delayed the passive restraint man-
date. First, the mandate did not become effective because several auto
manufacturers challenged the Agency's legal authority to impose such a
rule. 66 Second, the auto industry was concerned about the financial im-
plications of the mandate. 67 Thus, the deadline for compliance was ex-
tended from the 1974 model year to 1977.68
Auto makers like GM, independently recognizing the need for further
63. See Air Bag Chronology, USA TODAY, (last modified Aug. 5, 1998)
<http:// www.usatoday.com/money/consumer/autos/mauto 133.htm>.
64. See 35 Fed. Reg. 16,927 (1970) (describing the purpose of the proposed
amendment, NHTSA stated that passive restraint was "imperative" due to the
"wide-spread failure of the public to fasten [their] seat belts").
65. See id. Under the standard, all vehicles manufactured by the 1974 model
year were to be equipped with a passive restraint device, designed to protect an
unbelted average-sized male (5'9" 165 pounds) in a 30 miles per hour (mph) crash
into a fixed barrier. See id.
66. See Chrysler Corp. v. Dep't of Transp., 472 F.2d 659, 659 (6th Cir. 1972)
(rejecting a petition brought by Chrysler, Jeep, AMC, and Ford arguing that
NHTSA's rule setting a 1973 deadline for the passive restraint rule was arbitrary
and capricious). In rejecting the petition, the court upheld NHTSA's authority to
impose a requirement of advanced technological devices such as air bags. See id
at 660. "[The] [p]urpose of [the] Motor Vehicle Safety Act is to enable the federal
government to impel auto manufacturers to develop and apply new technology to
the task of improving the safety design of [vehicles] as readily as possible." Id. at
661. Hence, while the court decided that the test procedures and devices required
by the safety standard failed the "statutorily required criteria of objectivity," the
court noted that NHTSA's authority was not limited to "issuing standards based
solely on devices already fully developed." Id. at 660-61.
67. See Chadwell, supra note 56, at 141, 145, & 181 n.30 (citing to National
Archives White House Conversations). In 1971, during the Nixon Administration,
Ford Motor Company President, Lee Iacocca, met with the President. See id. at
181. During this meeting, Iacocca lobbied President Nixon to "shelve" the air bag
requirement. See id Iacocca argued that forcing American car manufacturers to
install air bags would create a financial burden on domestic auto manufacturers,
thereby placing U.S. companies at a disadvantage with respect to Japanese car
manufacturers. See id
68. See 40 Fed. Reg. 16,217 (1975).
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,i.testing and development of air bags, launched a "dual deployment" sys-
tem in 1973.69 It conducted a field trial program of the new system in
1,000 cars.70 In these systems, the bumper sensor "produced a signal
early in the crash ... caus[ing] an initial lower level of deployment
.... If the force of the crash is more serious, in high speed crashes
for example, a secondary, more aggressive burst is discharged, when
necessary, that "eliminates the standing child problem and helps the out-
of-position occupant problem. 7 2 If Ford and Chrysler testing on dual
deployment systems revealed positive outcomes in air bag development,
why were these systems not introduced in cars when the air bag mandate
finally went into effect in 1991? The reason may well be corporate dis-
regard.73
GM marketed dual stage inflators in approximately ten thousand of its
cars in the mid-1970s.74 Although there were no instances in which
children were injured by deploying air bags with this system, 75 GM dis-
69. See Sherman, supra note 13, at 83 (describing GM's field trial as 18%
effective at mitigating injuries).
70. See Air Bag Chronology, USA TODAY MONEY, (last modified Aug. 5,
1998) <http://www.usatoday.com/money/consumer/autos/mauto 133. htm>.
71. See THE AIR BAG CRISIS, supra note 3, at 7 (quoting E. Klove and R.
Oglesby, Special Problems and Considerations in the Development ofAir Cushion
Restraint Systems, SOCIETY OF AUTOMOTIVE ENGINEERS 720411 (1972)). This
low-level deployment for small collisions "minimized the action of the cushion
against out-of-position occupants." Id.
72. Id at 7, 8 (quoting Chrysler Inter-Company Correspondence, P.D. Vrzal to
R.M. Sinclair).
73. See id. at 169 (discussing how automobile manufacturers "placed profit
before safety.").
74. See Air Bag On-Off Switches, 62 Fed. Reg. 62,406, 62,411 n.1 1(1997) (to
be codified at 49 C.F.R. pts. 571 & 595) (arguing that the FMVSS 208 does not
require a certain air bag design that is dangerous to children; rather, the Agency
argues that FMVSS allows a variety of design features that would reduce or elimi-
nate air bag fatalities, and that auto makers, like GM, manufactured such air bag
systems in the 1970s).
75. See THE AIR BAG CRISIS, supra note 3, at 11 (citing NATIONAL HIGHWAY
TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMINISTRATION, Report: Automobile Occupant Crash Protec-
tion, July 1980). "[T]here have been no instances in which children are known to
have been injured by deploying air bags." Id at 11. The only infant death in the
1,000 dual deployment field program occurred in May 16, 1973, where an unre-
strained, seven-week-old infant was killed in the passenger seat. See id. at 9.
NHTSA determined that there was a significant amount of pre-impact braking be-
fore the collision, causing the child to be thrown to the floor at the time of air bag
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continued the option at the end of the 1976 model year, citing lack of
consumer interest. 76 Apart from corporate decisions affecting the intro-
duction of air bags into the American market, a regulatory war was
brewing over the issuance of the passive restraint rule.
The most clear and direct impact on the fate of mandated passive re-
straint, however, came from changing political winds. The rule was
suspended indefinitely under the "lame duck" administration of Presi-
dent Gerald Ford. 7 The next round of presidential appointees, this time
under President Jimmy Carter, reimposed the passive restraint rule in
June of 1977.78 The reissued rule required a complete phase-in of pas-
sive restraints by 1984. 79
The rule's oscillating trend did not end there. After the rule was re-
imposed, it was later postponed,80 rescinded,8' and again suspended,82
before surviving a court challenge in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia. 83 In 1981, President Ronald Reagan's political
appointees, "determined to get the government monkey off of [the pub-
lic's] back,"84 delayed 85 and then completely rescinded the passive re-
straint rule.86 The United States Supreme Court subsequently ruled that
deployment. See id. at 11.
76. See id. at ll.
77. See 42 Fed. Reg. 5,071 (1977).
78. See 42 Fed. Reg. 34,289 (1977).
79. See id.
80. See46 Fed. Reg. 21,172 (1981).
81. See Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards; Occupant Crash Protection,
46 Fed. Reg. 53,419 (1981) (codified at 49 C.F.R. pt. 571).
82. See Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards Occupant Crash Protection;
Automatic Occupant Restraint Requirement, 48 Fed. Reg. 39,908 (1983) (codified
at 49 C.F.R. pt. 571).
83. See Pacific Legal Found. v. Dep't of Transp., 593 F.2d 1338, 1347 (D.C.
Cir. 1978) cert. denied, 444 U.S. 830 (1979). ("Rapidly inflating air bags also may
injure out-of-position passengers in the front seat, especially children. New meth-
ods of gas generation, however, permit an initially slower inflation, with the aim of
more gently moving the occupant back from the dashboard and out of harm's
way.").
84. See Chadwell, supra note 56, at 147 (citing to the President's Remarks to
Annual Convention of United States Jaycees, 17 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 675,
676 (June 24, 1981) and the President's Remarks to Central City and California
Tax Payers' Association, 17 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 684, 685-86 (June 25,
1981)).
85. See 46 Fed. Reg. at 21,172.
86. See Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards; Occupant Crash Protection,
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the recission was "not properly reasoned" and remanded the issue back
to the DOT. 7
With increasing vehicular fatalities on the roads, Elizabeth Dole, then
Secretary of Transportation, reissued the passive restraint rule in July
1984.88 This rule required a phase-in of passive restraints beginning in
all vehicles manufactured after September 1, 1986, to be completed by
September 1, 1989. Much to the chagrin of air bag proponents,89 the
final rule did not require the installation of air bags.90 The passive re-
straint rule required auto makers to include one of the following: 1) a
driver-side air bag with automatic front seat belts; 2) automatic front
seat belts; or 3) manual front seat belts with a belt warning system.
9 1
Congress did not force NHTSA to mandate air bags until the Fall of
1991, when it enacted legislation that required a phase-in of air bags in
all light vehicles during the 1997 and 1998 model years. 92 This legisla-
tion, part of the Intermodel Surface Transportation and Efficiency Act of
1991, provided that air bags would be the only means by which automo-
bile manufacturers could comply with the passive restraint rule.93
Ironically, consumer demand for air bags, and not the passive restraint
mandate, prompted the installation of most air bags.94 By the beginning
46 Fed. Reg. at 53,419.
87. See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Aut. Ins. Co., 463 U.S.
29 (1983).
88. See Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard; Occupant Crash Protection, 49
Fed. Reg. 28,962 (1984); 35 Fed. Reg. 16,927 (1970). This "passive restraint rule"
had its origins in the early 1970s, where Transportation Secretary John Volpe first
issued the rule requiring all vehicle manufacturers to implement a restraint that
required no action on the part of the driver (an unbelted average-sized male 5'9"
165 pounds). See id This could take the form of automatic safety belts, air bags,
padded interior dashboards, or some combination. See id.
89. See Timothy Wilton, Federalism Issues in "No Airbag" Tort Claims: Pre-
emption and Reciprocal Comity, 61 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1, 2 (1986). "Airbag
proponents have been disappointed by NHTSA's consistent refusal to mandate
installation of airbags, and the latest NHTSA decision has caused them to develop a
new strategy and to seek a new forum." Id. at 2.
90. See Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard; Occupant Crash Protection, 49
Fed. Reg. at 28,962.
91. See id.
92. See Intermodel Surface Transportation and Efficiency Act of 1991, Pub. L.
No. 102-240, 105 Stat. 1914 (codified as amended at 49 U.S.C § 30102 (1994)).
93. See id.
94. See Sherman, supra note 13, at 83 ("The buying public has voted strongly
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of the 1990s, several years after the initial air bag deadline, manufactur-
ers were rapidly installing air bags in all passenger cars and light trucks.
Between 1989 and 1996, more than fifty-six million vehicles equipped
with driver-side air bags were sold in this country. 95 Of those cars,
twenty-seven million had front passenger air bags.96 Many of the air
bag systems placed on the market had design features dangerous to chil-
dren and out-of-position occupants, namely: 1) single mode deploy-
ments,97 2) single thresholds,98 and 3) horizontal deployment. 99 One con-
in favor of airbags (and against automatic belts), so manufacturers currently are
struggling to meet demand."); THE AIR BAG CRISIS, supra note 3, at 28. Chrysler
discovered at consumer clinics in 1985 and 1987 that consumers did not favor the
motorized belts. See id. Chrysler then quickly became the first domestic automo-
bile manufacturer to make driver-side air bags standard in all cars in 1990 and the
first to install a driver's side air bag in minivans in 1991. See id. "[T]o avoid losing
market share, [other auto makers] quickly followed Chrysler. The air bag gold rush
of the 1990's was on." Id at 29.
95. See Graham et al., supra note 10, at 1418.
96. See id. But see THIRD REPORT TO CONGRESS, supra note 21, at 6-7 (re-
porting that between 1987 and 1995 only 13.5 million vehicles with passenger-side
air bags were registered).
97. See THE AIR BAG CRISIS, supra note 3, at 59. Single deployments utilize
an inflator that fills the bag with a single explosive burst of nitrogen gas. See id A
dual deployment system has a gentler bag deployment in low-speed collisions and a
more aggressive deployment in high-speed collisions. See id. GM marketed over
10,000 vehicles with dual-deployment air bag systems in the mid-1970s. See id at
10. According to NHTSA statistics, these systems caused no deaths or severe inju-
ries. See NATIONAL CENTER FOR STATISTICS & ANALYSIS, supra note 5; see also
NAT'L HIGHWAY SAFETY ADMIN., U.S. DEPT. OF TRANSP., AUTOMOBILE
OCCUPANT CRASH PROTECTION, Progress Report No. 3, July 1980, at 69 (stating
with respect to GM's mid-1970s dual deployment systems, "[tihere have been no
instances in which children are known to have been injured by deploying air
bags").
98. The difference between single thresholds and dual thresholds is that single
thresholds deploy in minor collisions, even if the occupant is lap-belted. See THE
AIR BAG CRISIS, supra note 3, at xviii. Dual threshold systems have a higher de-
ployment threshold if the occupant is lap-belted. See id If the, occupant is un-
belted, the air bag deploys in collisions of 12-18 mph. See id. "If the occupant is
belted (and air bag pr6tection is less necessary), the air bag does not deploy unless
the collision exceeds 18 mph." Id Mercedes Benz, BMW, and Audi use dual
thresholds. See id According to NHTSA, no occupants have been killed or se-
verely injured by these dual threshold air bag systems. See id.
99. Horizontal deployment occurs when air bags inflate "horizontally" towards
the passenger. See THE AIR BAG CRISIS, supra note 3, at xix. Vertical deployment,
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sumer group contends, "[H]ad these manufacturers tried to design an air
bag system that was dangerous to children, they could not have done
much better."'
00
Reports of problems with these designs surfaced almost immediately.
Between 1990 and 1993, reports of air bag fatalities and injuries began
filtering back to NHTSA.' 0 ' This only prompted NHTSA to issue a sun
visor warning label that failed to adequately warn of the danger.
0 2
Following Congress' mandate, air bag fatalities involving children be-
gan to surface for the first time between 1993 and 1995.103
By the end of 1995, NHTSA was aware of thirty-seven air bag fatali-
ties. 1 4 The Agency, however, took only marginal measures to address
what clearly became a crisis in auto safety. 0 5 Finally, on August 6,
1996, the Agency that had "promulgated, modified, revoked, and rein-
stated various Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards concerning air
bags," '0 6 now issued a wave of rulemakings intended to combat the
growing number of air bag fatalities. These rulemakings, a patchwork
of indirect measures, inadequately address the problem.
known to be much safer, was ignored by many auto makers. See id. at 58. This
system deploys vertically downward towards the occupant's knees and upward
along the windshield to form a "wall" in front of the occupant. See id at xviii.
100. Id. at 29.
101. See NATIONAL CENTER FOR STATISTICS & ANALYSIS, supra note 5.
102. See Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards; Occupant Crash Protection,
58 Fed. Reg. 46,551 (1994) (to be codified at 49 C.F.R. pt. 571); see also discus-
sion infra Part II.A.I. and note 110.
103. See NATIONAL CENTER FOR STATISTICS & ANALYSIS, supra note 5.
104. See id.
105. In 1995, NTSB issued a press release warning of the incidence of several
fatalities. See THE AIR BAG CRISIS, supra note 3, at 38. Even though NHTSA was
aware that air bags were causing injury and even death, the Agency only requested
public comments to share information about the adverse effects of air bags. See
Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards; Occupant Crash Protection, 60 Fed. Reg.
56,554 (1995) (to be codified at 49 C.F.R. pt. 571). A final rule was published
permitting installation of a manual device, an on-off switch, allowing for deactiva-
tion of the passenger-side air bag. See id. This measure was only for motorists
whose vehicles did not permit placing an infant restraint in the back seat. See 60
Fed. Reg. 27,233 (1995). In 1997, NHTSA would later extend this option to all
people. See infra Part II.C. (discussing deactivation).
106. Wilton, supra note 89, at 1.
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II. NHTSA: PUTTING THE BRAKES ON THE AIR BAG CRISIS OR
JUST A LOT OF HOT AIR?
A. Labeling and Notification Requirements
1. The Belated Rule
In 1992, the American Automobile Manufacturers Association
107
(AAMA) petitioned NHTSA to promulgate a rule requiring a uniform
labeling design "to ensure that all vehicle manufacturers provide the
same information to occupants."' 08  The first label warnings mandate
was not enacted until 1993.09 These labels contained language that in-
sufficiently alerted the public to the substantial risks." 0 Although the
rule invited auto makers to provide additional information in other
107. The organization was formerly known as the Motor Vehicle Manufacturers
Association and consists of three members: Chrysler Corporation, Ford Company,
and General Motors.
108. Letter Petition from Thomas H. Hanna, President of Motor Vehicle Manu-
facturers to the Honorable Jerry R. Curry, NHTSA Administrator (Feb. 27, 1992).
Some citizens groups criticized the auto industry's attempt at labeling requirements
as "a cynical effort ... to shield themselves from the lawsuits they knew would
come because of their terrible air bag designs." THE AIR BAG CRISIS, supra note 3,
at 33.
NHTSA did not consider this petition a high priority matter. Despite Agency
knowledge of fatalities and serious injuries caused by air bags, a 1992 publication
by the DOT listed this matter low priority. See Unified Agenda, 57 Fed. Reg.
51,732-33 (1992). Label Requirements for Air Bag-Equipped Vehicles is described
as "nonsignificant" with the Agency giving itself a deadline of "none." Id at
51,732. In the meantime, the air bag death toll continued to rise. See NATIONAL
CENTER FOR STATISTICS & ANALYSIS, supra note 5.
109. See Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards; Occupant Crash Protection,
58 Fed. Reg. 46,551 (1993); see also infra note 110 and accompanying text.
110. See 58 Fed. Reg. at 46,551. The language requirements of this label were
as follows:
Caution -- To Avoid Serious Injury
" For maximum safety protection in all types of crashes, you must always
wear your safety belt.
* Do not install rearward-facing child seats in any front passenger seat position.
* Do not sit or lean unnecessarily close to the air bag.
" Do not place any objects over the air bag or between the air bag and
yourself.
" See the owner's manual for further information and explanations.
Id. at 46,564.
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places, few did so."'
In 1995, the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) 2 investi-
gated six car accidents in which children in the front seat had been
killed, and concluded these fatalities would not have occurred, but for
the deployment of the air bag." 3 Following this investigation, in Octo-
ber 1995, an Urgent Action NTSB Safety Recommendation was sent to
all vehicle manufacturers. 114 It urged the auto industry to place en-
hanced warning labels in its vehicles and send letters to the registered
owners of cars with passenger-side air bags warning against placing
children in the front seat." 5 The auto industry did not respond in a
timely manner to this recommendation, but waited over a year before
mailing notification letters. 16 In this time, air bags killed thirty
children."
17
The next petition to NHTSA for labeling requirements on the adverse
111. See 58 Fed. Reg. at 46,564 (authorizing vehicle manufacturers to provide
additional information by way of car manuals). Suzuki corporation was the only
manufacturer who subsequently petitioned NHTSA to substitute the word "cau-
tion" for the stronger word, "WARNING." See THE AIR BAG CRISIS, supra note 3,
at 37.
112. The National Transportation Safety Board was established by the Depart-
ment of Transportation Act, Pub. L. No. 89-670, 80 Stat. 935 (1966). Congress
later deemed the Board to be an agency independent of DOT. See The Independent
Safety Board Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-633, 88 Stat. 2166 (1974).
113. See THE AIR BAG CRISIS, supra note 3, at 38 (citing a National Transporta-
tion Safety Board Safety Recommendation (Nov. 2, 1995) (on file with author)).
114. See id
115. See id.
116. "On November 2, 1996, Andrew J. Card, Jr., President of the American
Automobile Manufacturers Association announced that GM, Ford, and Chrysler
would mail the notification letters." THE AIR BAG CRISIS, supra note 3, at 41.
These letters were eventually mailed in the first quarter of 1997, after the number
of children killed by air bags rose to thirty-eight. See id; see also Daniel McGinn
& Daniel Pedersen, A Life-or-Death Choice?, NEWSWEEK, Oct. 20, 1997, at 40
(explaining that on December 25, 1996, the air bag in a 1995 Plymouth Voyager
deployed in a low-speed collision, leaving a six-year-old child "ventilator-
dependent" for the rest of his life). In February 1997, the family received a notifi-
cation letter regarding air bags from Chrysler. The letter included adhesive warn-
ing labels to be placed in the car. See id. at 44.
117. See THE AIR BAG CRISIS, supra note 3, at 39. For a table chart outlining
the data associated with each air bag death, such as the make and year of the car, as
well as the age, height, and sex of each victim, see NATIONAL CENTER FOR
STATISTICS & ANALYSIS, supra note 5.
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effects of air bags was filed in July 1996.118 NHTSA granted the peti-
tion in part, mandating the placement of enhanced warning labels in all
vehicles." 9 The Agency did not rule on the second part of the petition
that mandated the mailing of notification letters to owners. 20 Media
coverage surrounding the controversy over warning labels prompted the
auto industry to send owners information on the fatal nature of some air
bag deployments.'
2'
The final rule promulgated by NHTSA requires new, attention-
drawing labels to replace the existing labels in cars that do not have
smart air bag technology. 22 NHTSA acknowledges that the new labels
will increase awareness about air bag risks. The Agency concedes,
however, that the labels will produce "only a 'very little' reduction in
fatalities and injuries."' 23 Indeed, it appears as though the warning la-
bels have not substantially impacted the reduction of risks to children.
24
118. See THE AIR BAG CRISIS, supra note 3, at 40-41.
119. Compare Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards; Occupant Crash Pro-
tection, 61 Fed. Reg. 60,206 (1996) (mandating stronger warning label language),
with Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards; Occupant Crash Protection, 58 Fed.
Reg. 46,551 (1993) (containing earlier warning label language insufficient to warn
vehicle owners). The language of the earlier warning labels, printed in gray and
white did little to capture the attention of vehicle owners. See supra note 110 and
accompanying text. The new petition for increased warning labels contained strong
language, with bright colors of red, yellow, black, and white:
Warning! Death or Serious Injury Can Occur
* Children 12 And Under Can be Killed by the Air Bag
* The Back Seat is the Safest Place for Children
" Never Put a Rear-Facing Child Seat in the Front
* Sit As Far Back As Possible From the Air Bag
* Always Use Seat Belts and Child Restraints
61 Fed. Reg. at 60,207, 60,212.
120. See Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards; Occupant Safety Protection,
61 Fed. Reg. at 60,206, 60,214. Adopted in 1996, NHTSA's final rule concerning
warning labels states, "NHTSA is aware that some manufacturers intend to send
letters to current owners of vehicles with passenger-side air bags. These letters
may include copies of the new warning labels. NHTSA encourages manufacturers
to do this." Id. at 60,214.
121. See THE AIR BAG CRISIS, supra note 3, at 4 1.
122. See Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards; Child Restraint Systems, 63
Fed. Reg. 52,626 (1998) (adopting amendments to the final rule on labeling re-
quirements that concern vehicle owners whose passenger air bags are deactivated,
thus allowing drivers to place infants' car seats in the front of the car).
123. Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards; Occupant Crash Protection, 61
Fed. Reg. at 60,208.
124. See Many Parents Still Place Infants Near Air Bags (visited Feb. 18, 1999)
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2. The Effects of the Labeling Requirements
The labeling requirements imposed by NHTSA are nonetheless vital
to the resolution of the air bag crisis. The new language of the warning
labels will effectively alert consumers that the air bags in their vehicles
may be fatal to children, short-statured drivers, or out-of-position occu-
pants. Yet, while the Agency imposed bright label warnings in all vehi-
cles, it refused to mandate notification letters to individual owners of
vehicles with these air bag design systems installed. 125 The Agency de-
termined that in order to require notification letters, it must find a "de-
fect" in certain air bag equipped vehicles.
26
The auto industry's decision to refrain from mailing notification let-
ters to vehicle owners with unsafe air bag designs has already had
deadly repercussions. In one example, a child was left ventilator-
dependent for life due to head and neck injuries resulting from an air
bag deployed in a fender-bender. 2' The accident occurred on Christmas
day in 1996. Two months after the accident, the family received a letter
in the mail from Chrysler Corporation with adhesive warning labels en-
closed to be placed in the car. Had NHTSA required automobile manu-
facturers to disseminate this information, fewer fatalities and injuries
would have occurred. 28 Not only is it disturbing that car companies
<http://cnn.com/US/9807/16/infant.air.bags/> (reporting on findings from The Air
Bag Safety Campaign which indicates that nearly 175,000 babies are still riding in
the front seat of cars with air bags, despite parental knowledge of the risks associ-
ated with air bag deployment).
125. Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards; Occupant Crash Protection, 61
Fed. Reg. at 60,214 (acknowledging that letters may be sent to current owners
about the risks of air bag deployment, NHTSA "encourages" manufacturers to mail
out such letters).
126. See THE AIR BAG CRISIS, supra note 3, at 40.
127. See McGinn & Pedersen, supra note 116, at 40.
128. See Air Bag Safety: Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on Commerce, Sci-
ence, and Transportation, 105th Congress 9-10 (1997) (statement of the Honorable
Bill Frist, U.S. Senator from Tennessee). Quoting from a letter from a constituent,
the Senator stated,
At first, we were certain that Frances must have hit her head on the
dashboard . . . because the swelling and pressure in her head was
five times what that of a normal person's was. Imagine the horror to
learn that all she had come into contact with was an air bag explod-
ing in her face at 200 miles per hour .... [H]ad we been notified in
November'of 1995 of the dangers of passenger-side air bags, as the
NHTSA had requested, Frances might still be alive today.
Id. at9.
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would choose to forego sending safety alerts to consumers, it is uncon-
scionable that an administrative agency devoted to U.S. auto safety
would permit such a delay in warning the public about the risks associ-
ated with air bags.
B. Depowering Forceful Air Bags Has Only
Short-Term Benefits
1. The Depowering Rule and Its Effects
In January 1997, NHTSA proposed to amend the FMVSS 208 tempo-
rarily to provide auto makers discretion to depower the force of their air
bags. 129 In an effort to ensure that air bags would inflate less aggres-
sively, the proposal allowed manufacturers to make quick changes in air
bag design. 3 ° One approach replacing the standard's barrier crash test
requirement' 3' permitted manufacturers to use a sled test option,
132
129. See Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards; Occupant Crash Protection,
62 Fed. Reg. 807 (1997) (to be codified at 49 C.F.R. pt. 571).
130. See Automakers Reach Consensus on Air Bag Improvements (visited Feb.
18, 1999) <http://www.cnn.com/US/9611/15/air.bags./index.html> (detailing the
agreement of auto makers at a Toronto conference where participants agreed that
the AAMA depowering proposal was the preferred approach, allowing depowering
"to occur quickly").
131. A barrier-crash test is a frontal collision into a wall.
132. See THE AIR BAG CRISIS, supra note 3, at 45. A sled test can be distin-
guished from a barrier crash test by the manner in which the test is conducted.
In a sled test the vehicle is placed on a platform or sled mounted on
a track. The sled is then thrust backwards along the track by a hy-
draulic piston. The deceleration of this reverse propulsion simulates
the deceleration seen in a frontal crash. As such, the reverse propul-
sion causes the air bag to deploy as it would in a frontal crash.
Id The unbelted sled test option would incorporate a 125 millisecond crash pulse.
See THE AIR BAG CRISIS, supra note 3, at 45. Crash pulse determines the strin-
gency of the test and refers generally to the acceleration-time history of the "occu-
pant compartment of a vehicle" during a crash. See Federal Motor Vehicle Safety
Standards; Occupant Crash Protection, 62 Fed. Reg. at 12,960, 12,961 n.5. This
pulse is the time in milliseconds that it takes for a car to come to a complete stop
after striking a fixed barrier at 30 mph. See id For example, "an occupant will
undergo greater forces if the crash pulse g's are higher at the peak, or the duration
of the crash pulse is shorter." Id at 12961. Head and chest injury criteria are
measured in g's. See id G-force measures the "acceleration of gravity," or force
of an impact. See Kevin Clemens, Air Bags Can Kill Children, AUTOMOBILE, Sept.
1993, at 24 (exposing the risks to children seated in the front passenger seat).
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where the vehicle is stopped instantly, rather than actually crashed. An-
other option is the reduction of the chest acceleration requirement 3 3 that
an unbelted male dummy must meet at speeds up to thirty miles per
hour. 34 Both options were a change from the barrier crash test, which
had been in place during the 1990s air bag manufacturing.
Before the final rule was issued in March 1998, the air bag standard1
3 1
for automatic protection required the use of: 1) a 50th percentile male
dummy, 36 2) a barrier-crash test, 3) speeds of up to 30 mph, and 4) cer-
tain injury criteria for the head and chest. 1.37 The depowering method
requested by the American Automobile Manufacturers Association at-
tempts to address the high level of force at which the air bag inflates
during deployment, the leading cause of air bag fatalities.
38
The AAMA's petition prompted the Agency to adopt an interim rule
permitting, but not requiring, auto manufacturers to depower all air
133. The chest acceleration requirement, initially at 60 g's, would be raised to
80 g's, which would make it easier for manufacturers to meet the requirement. See
62 Fed. Reg. at 12,962. In its final rule on depowering, the Agency did not provide
such a reduction in the chest acceleration requirement because no manufacturer
indicated that they would pursue this approach. See Federal Motor Vehicle Safety
Standards; Occupant Crash Protection, 62 Fed. Reg. at 12,965.
134. See Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards; Occupant Crash Protection,
62 Fed. Reg. at 12,964.
135. See Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards; Occupant Crash Protection,
62 Fed. Reg. at 8,917. While the standard does not specify the design requirements
of an air bag, the vehicles must meet specified injury criteria.
[T]he Standard specifies two crash tests for determining whether
vehicles comply with the standard's injury criteria. Both tests in-
volve crashing a vehicle into a barrier at speeds of up to 30mph.
One crash uses unbelted anthropomorphic test dummies, while the
other uses belted dummies. The unbelted crash test ensures that the
vehicle provides effective 'automatic protection'...
Id.
136. A 50th percentile Hybrid III male test dummy weighs approximately 172
pounds, 5'8". See Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards; Occupant Crash Pro-
tection, 62 Fed. Reg. at 813. A 5th percentile Hybrid III female dummy is 5 feet
and 110 pounds. See id. See also Graham et al., supra note 10, at 1418, 1424.
137. See 62 Fed. Reg. at 12,964. Specific injury criteria measured on the test
dummies must be met in barrier crashes at speeds up to 30 mph, and at a range of
angles from zero to 30 degrees off-center. See id.
138. See Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards; Occupant Crash Protection,
62 Fed. Reg. at 813 (describing in its final rule the reasons behind the petition initi-
ated by the American Automobile Manufacturers Association (AAMA)).
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bags.' 39 After research, NHTSA concluded that an average depowering
of twenty to thirty-five percent reduces the risk of air bag fatalities in
low speed crashes.140 In its final rule, the Agency adopted, as a tempo-
rary alternative, the option to utilize the unbelted sled test protocol to
allow for depowered systems.141 The NHTSA Reauthorization Act of
1998 provides that the unbelted sled test option will remain in effect
only until advanced air bags are completely phased in.
142
2. Why the Alternative Sled Test Does Not Make the Grade
In permitting the depowering of air bags by use of a sled test, NHTSA
adopted a remedy with significant drawbacks. Many of the flaws in the
rule are acknowledged by the Agency, but are justified as necessary to
provide auto makers with "maximum flexibility" in decreasing the inju-
rious effects of their designs. 43 The Agency itself stated that the rule
"would most likely result in trade-offs for adults."'' 44 Further, NHTSA
1
139. See 62 Fed. Reg. at 12,964 (stating "[t]he issuance of any rule narrowing
the discretion [of] vehicle manufacturers . . .would involve considerably more
complex issues than a rulemaking simply adding greater flexibility.").
140. See Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards; Occupant Crash Protection,
62 Fed. Reg. at 12,966 (discussing the steps taken by the Agency after receiving
comments on its NPRM to depower air bags).
141. Overall, the decision was supported as a quick, interim solution of adverse
effects caused by air bags. See Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards; Occupant
Crash Protection, 62 Fed. Reg. at 12,963. Commentors in support of depowering
included, Public Citizen, Advocates, Insurance Institute for Highway Safety, the
AAMA, Association of International Automobile Manufacturers (representing all
domestic and foreign auto manufacturers), and Automotive Occupant Restraints
Council (representing suppliers). See id.
142. See Transportation Equity Act for the 21st Century, Pub. L. No. 105-178,
112 Stat. 107, 323 (1998).
143. See Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards; Occupant Crash Protection,
62 Fed. Reg. at 12,963. The Agency states,
In the meantime, however, NHTSA wants to be sure that the vehicle
manufacturers have the necessary tools to address immediately the
problem of adverse effects of air bags . . . .Until the agency con-
ducts its rulemaking regarding smart air bags [our] best ... focus
[is] on ensuring that manufacturers have appropriate flexibility to
address ... the problem.
Id
144. Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards; Occupant Crash Protection, 62
Fed. Reg. at 12,963. In rationalizing this sacrifice of adult safety for child safety,
the Agency noted that this is a temporary rule, with only a four year "sunset" provi-
sion on the sled test, requiring the standard of barrier crash testing by model year
1999]
764 Journal of Contemporary Health Law and Policy [Vol. 15:739
Administrator Martinez has "characterized depowering as 'a wash' be-
cause the benefits of depowering in low-speed collisions may be offset
(or exceeded) by [an increase in adult deaths].' 45
NHTSA also concedes that various solutions exist that are superior to
the depowering of air bags, including higher deployment thresholds,
dual stage inflators, and smart air bags. 146 The Agency posits that these
alternatives are already permitted under FMVSS 208 and that this rule-
making simply takes less time if the Agency mandated other alterna-
tives. 147 NHTSA erred in permitting flawed but expedient alternatives to
the crisis when better, more time-consuming solutions exist.
Admittedly, Agency rulemaking on requiring dual deployment sys-
tems, higher sensor thresholds, or smart air bags would be a lengthy
process. But the Agency considered these safer alternatives for women
and children when the passive restraint rule was issued in 1984, yet
failed to set rigorous performance requirements that would have com-
pelled auto makers to use these types of safer designs.
Permitting auto makers to depower bags will not solve the problem of
air bag fatalities because depowering is needed only in low-speed colli-
sions.148 Today's single deployment systems or "single burst inflators"
cannot be depowered enough to make them safe for children and also
protect against death or injury for unbelted adults in severe collisions.
149
Because depowerment is not likely to diminish the risks associated with
air bag deployment, other measures promulgated by the Agency must be
examined.
2002. See id. at 12,967.
145. THE AIR BAG CRISIS, supra note 3, at 46 (citing 62 Fed. Reg. 12,960,
12,963).
146. See Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards; Occupant Crash Protection,
62 Fed. Reg. at 12,968.
147. See id. at 12,963 (noting that although there are a variety of other alterna-
tives to depowering, implementing these measures would simply take too long on
which to rule, due to the inherently lengthy processes of administrative agencies).
148. See THE AIR BAG CRISIS, supra note 3, at 86.
149. See id. at 87.
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C. The Deactivation Option: A Dangerous Alternative
to the Air Bag Crisis
1. The Deactivation/On-Off Switch Rule
Under current federal safety standards, a vehicle dealer or repair busi-
ness is not permitted to deactivate any safety feature installed in an
automobile, including air bags.' 50 From 1996 to 1997, spawned by the
growing skepticism of air bag safety, 151 NHTSA was inundated with
requests from the public to deactivate their air-bags. 52 As of January
1997, the Agency issued exemptions in seventy-six cases for the deacti-
vation of air bags' 53 to owners who transport at-risk occupants.
154
NHTSA granted these waivers to owners whose vehicle did not have a
back seat where a child could be placed or where drivers needed to
monitor a child with special medical conditions.'55 Due to the volume of
150. See 49 U.S.C. §, 30122 (1994). Under the standard, "[a] manufacturer,
distributor, dealer, or motor vehicle repair business may not knowingly make inop-
erative any part of a device or element of design installed on or in a motor vehicle
or motor vehicle equipment in compliance with an applicable standard." Id
151. See Air Bag On-Off Switches, 62 Fed. Reg. 62,406, 62,416. ("The volume
of these requests peaked in the spring, possibly in response to the extensive public-
ity surrounding the NTSB hearings in Mid-March...").
152. See id. ("From October 1, 1996 through October 30, 1997, NHTSA re-
ceived 11,838 written requests for air bag deactivation.").
153. See 62 Fed. Reg. 831, 833 (1997).
154. At-risk occupants include children, short drivers, and persons with medical
conditions that would be adversely affected by the deployment of the air bag. See
62 Fed. Reg. at 12,961 n.2.
155. See id "The majority of medical conditions were related to apnea, al-
though exemptions have also been granted for children in wheelchairs, and children
with a tendency to spit up and choke." Id at 833 n.3. In situations where the
Agency permitted deactivation of air bags, the Agency strongly suggested that the
bag be reactivated once the medical condition is no longer present. See generally
THE RONALD REAGAN INSTITUTE OF EMERGENCY MEDICINE DEPARTMENT OF
EMERGENCY MEDICINE & THE NATIONAL CRASH ANALYSIS CENTER, Final Report
to the National Conference on Medical Indications for Air Bag Disconnection,
presented to the George Washington University Medical Center, Washington, D.C.,
(July 16-18, 1997) (enumerating specific medical criteria which place an occupant
in a high-risk category for air bag deployment injuries that outweigh the benefits of
air bags). The panel, consisting of 17 George Washington University physicians,
concludes that while most vehicle owners should keep their air bags connected,
persons with certain medical conditions are recommended to disconnect their air
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requests received to deactivate front-passenger and driver-side air bags,
the Agency issued a final rule effective January 1998. 56 The final rule
authorizes retrofitted on-off switches for consumers who apply to
NHTSA and are considered to be at risk.1
57
NHTSA evaluated a number of policy considerations in determining
whether deactivation of air bag systems would reduce the risk of harm to
children.' In permitting passenger air bag deactivation, NHTSA enu-
merated several reasons why parents may need to place children in the
front seat.159 Among these reasons were: 1) the need to closely monitor a
child with a medical condition, 2) the predicament faced by some driv-
ers who transport a greater number of children than the number of rear
seats in the vehicle, and 3) the reality that children usually have a strong
desire to seat themselves in the front.'
60
These concerns, however, were weighed against the Agency's belief
that deactivation is "more problematic with respect to older children.''
While NHTSA maintained that older children who are properly re-
strained may benefit from air bags in certain crashes, it is more likely
that they will be unrestrained. 62 Due to the probability of improper or
no restraint,1 63 and the severe risks of injury or death to the unrestrained
child, NHTSA is allowing deactivation, only when necessary, for pas-
senger-side air bags.'
64
The policy concerns, as well as statistical data, change considerably
bags. See id. at 6.
156. See 62 Fed. Reg. 62,406 (1997) (exempting motor vehicle dealers from the
statutory prohibition against making safety devices inoperative).
157. See id The air bag deactivation rule constitutes an exception to the federal
prohibition against deactivating any safety device.
158. See 62 Fed. Reg. at 835.
159. See id at 834.
160. See id.
161. Id.
162. See Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards; Occupant Crash Protection,
62 Fed. Reg. 12,960, 12,961 (1997) (describing that fatalities involving children
"have a number of fairly consistent characteristics;" among them is a lack of any
type of restraint on older children).
163. See John Elliot Leighton, Are Children Caught in the Seat of Disaster?,
TRIAL, Mar. 1998, at 54. "Nearly 2,800 children under 15 are killed annually in
crashes. Forty percent of children under 5 are improperly restrained in child safety
seats, while as many as 90 percent of child restraints are not installed correctly." Id
164. See Air Bag Deactivation, 62 Fed. Reg. at 834.
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when discussing the need for deactivation of driver-side air bags.' 65 Be-
cause the total number of deaths attributed to driver-side air bags is less
than two percent of the number of lives saved, 166 NHTSA does not re-
gard the need for deactivation on the driver side as compelling as the
need for the passenger side. 167 Nonetheless, due to the risks air bags
pose to some drivers, the Agency will allow deactivation for the driver
side with a more limited scope.'
68
NHTSA's deactivation rule imposes several conditions on vehicle
owners wishing to deactivate a driver-side air bag. 69 First, the rule does
not permit deactivation in vehicles equipped with smart air bags. 70 Sec-
ond, provided that evidence shows depowerment reduces death and in-
jury, the rule prohibits the deactivation for vehicles that have already
been depowered.171 Third, making an informed decision to deactivate is
a requirement written into the rule. 72 Other conditions, aside from those
required of the vehicle's owner, have also been imposed by the rule. For
instance, dealers who deactivate air bags prior to purchase are required
to provide the vehicle owner with a NHTSA information sheet on the
risks associated with deactivation. 173 Further, the owners of such vehi-
cles must sign a written authorization form stating that they have read
the information sheet. 74 Finally, for each deactivated air bag, the new
rule requires labeling of the deactivated air bags in the car's interior. 75
In issuing the final rule, NHTSA was concerned whether deactivation
should be permitted at the owner's discretion or whether a showing of
serious risk of harm would be required. 76 The new rule incorporated a
provision that owners must certify she, or another user of the vehicle, is
a member of one of the risk groups. 77 Data is not yet available on
165. See id. at 835.
166. See id.
167. See id. at 834; see also Graham et al., supra note 10, at 1418-19.
168. See Air Bag Deactivation, 62 Fed. Reg. at 831, 835.
169. See id
170. See id. at 832.
171. See id. at 835.
172. Discussing requirements for deactivation, the Agency states that only when
the dealer or repair businesses provide the owner with a NHTSA information sheet
for review and signature, will they be permitted to deactivate. See id.




177. See McGinn & Pedersen, supra note 116, at 40 (comparing two starkly
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whether the implementation of this rule has substantially impacted the
number of lives lost as a result of air bag deployment. But because de-
activation may vitiate the benefits of air bags to adults, this interim so-
lution may produce an increased risk of death or injury to vehicle occu-
pants sitting in front of deactivated air bags.
2. Why Deactivation May Do More Harm Than Good
In adopting this interim deactivation policy,' 78 NHTSA created a bal-
ancing test. Safety benefits to adults were weighed against those of
children. 79 Although this final rule is effectively at odds with the 1993
passive restraint rule 8° in that it allows vehicle owners and manufactur-
ers to deactivate the very safety feature whose installation was man-
dated, the rule is a necessary interim solution. The final rule indicates
the Agency is extremely hesitant to permit vehicle owners to deactivate
air bag systems. 18' This is due, in part, to the significant overall safety
benefits of air bags.'8 2 Yet because certain types of vehicles have air
bag designs that are dangerous for children, short-statured adults, and
out-of-position occupants, deactivation of such air bags may be a neces-
sary evil.
Sadly, the deactivation option, as well as the other interim measures
discussed in this Note, would not have been necessary but for NHTSA's
own failure in 1984 to permit rather than require auto makers to install
design systems that were proven to be safer for children and short-
different air bag-related cases). One exposd was on a young woman who arguably
would have been saved had her car been equipped with an air bag. See id. This
was contrasted to a young boy rendered quadriplegic due to an air bag deployment
that severed his vertebrae in a low-speed collision. See id. The stories were in-
tended to highlight the inherent difficulties consumers may face in deciding
whether to deactivate their air bags. See id.
178. The deactivation rule, an interim measure, will no longer be relied upon
once smart air bag technology is phased into the automotive stream of commerce.
See 63 Fed. Reg. 49,958, 49,961 (1998) (to be codified at 49 C.F.R. pts. 571, 585,
587, & 595). NHTSA's newest proposed smart air bag rule requires a phase-out of
manual on-off switches and deactivation. See infra text accompanying note 217.
179. See Air Bag Deactivation, 62 Fed. Reg. at 832.
180. The passive restraint rule required that all air bags be installed in vehicles
due to its propensity to reduce the number of deaths on the roads. See Air Bag
Deactivation, 62 Fed. Reg. at 832. This measure allows owners to deactivate the
very air bags that Congress mandated be installed. See id.
181. See Air Bag Deactivation, 62 Fed. Reg. at 835.
182. See Graham et al., supra note 10, at 1424.
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statured adults. While some auto makers designed systems proven to be
safe and effective in all types of crash conditions,18 3 most auto makers
marketed systems that merely satisfied the minimum standard provided
by the Agency.
To disallow vehicle owners from minimizing the risk to themselves or
their children would be a preposterous position for the Agency to take.
This is especially so in light of the fact that the Agency is engaged in a
massive education campaign to inform the public that air bags pose seri-
ous risks to children and adults. The Agency realizes its predicament
noting, "While air bags are providing significant overall benefits, they
are also causing an unacceptable risk .. .
One concern with this final rule is the risk of over-deactivation. Al-
though only a temporary measure, the element of fear is likely playing
into consumers' decisions to deactivate their systems. As such, those
skeptical of air bags due to current negative publicity surrounding them,
may be more inclined to deactivate even when there is no particular risk
to that vehicle owner.
Deactivation in these situations renders vehicles wholly ineffective in
providing passive restraint to an occupant, thereby eliminating any of
the safety benefits of air bags. 8 5 In anticipating this potential unin-
tended effect, the Agency "urges all owners who choose to deactivate
their air bag to reactivate the air bag once the perceived need for deacti-
vation has abated."'186 The rule, fully effective in 1998, has yet to pro-
duce a massive rush by American car owners to deactivate their air bags.
Aside. from this potential undesirable effect, it is critical that NHTSA
provide information to consumers allowing them to make an informed
decision. Simply put, the Agency that set unacceptably low perform-
ance standards for air bags now has an obligation to ensure that consum-
ers considering on-off switches be fully apprised of the circumstances
on which the switches should be used. The Agency was correct in
183. See THE AIR BAG CRISIS, supra note 3, at 24.
184. Air Bag Deactivation, 62 Fed. Reg. at 836.
185. See Insurers Want Names of Drivers Who Disconnect Air Bags (visited
Feb. 18, 1999) <http://www.cnn.comIUS/9801/07/air.bags/index.html> (describing
NHTSA's refusal to release the names of more than 3,000 people who have per-
mission from the Agency to install on-off switches for their cars). The report de-
tails that some insurance companies may charge higher premiums to those insured
who have on-off switches due to the added risk to passengers when the bag is de-
activated. See id
186. Air Bag Deactivation, 62 Fed. Reg. at 836.
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passing the air bag deactivation rule, but it bears responsibility for al-
lowing auto makers to sell millions of vehicles with dangerous air bag
systems to an unsuspecting American public. Fortunately, however, this
is only a temporary measure designed to reduce air bags' negative ef-
fects while the Agency awaits implementation of smart air bag technol-
ogy.
D. Proposed Moratorium on the Unbelted Test
Protocol Increases Risk to Adults
1. Should NHTSA Test Air Bags on Belted or Unbelted Occupants?
Another depowering rule pending at NHTSA addresses the risks
posed to particular vehicle occupants by placing a moratorium on testing
with unbelted dummies. 8 7 The standard currently mandates that the rate
at which air bags deploy should be forceful enough to protect dummies
not restrained by seat belts. The Agency's request for comments states,
"[T]he Agency has concluded that section 2508 of the Intermodel Sur-
face Transportation Efficiency Act of 1991 precludes it from eliminating
the unbelted test requirement."'' 88 Nonetheless, the Agency seeks infor-
mation regarding the positive and negative effects of eliminating the
unbelted test requirement 89 in an effort to study all potential solutions to
the air bag deaths.' 90
The threshold question involved in this petition is whether the stan-
dard should continue to require protection of unrestrained occupants.
As explained by NHTSA in its request for comments, the present stan-
dard requires occupant protection "by means that require no action by
vehicle occupants."' 9' If the unbelted test was eliminated, the Agency
argues, there would be "no way to ensure that the air bags would in fact
187. See Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards; Occupant Crash Protection,
62 Fed. Reg. 8,917 (1997).
188. Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards; Occupant Crash Protection, 62
Fed. Reg. at 8,917.
189. See id.
190. See id.
191. 62 Fed. Reg. at 8,918. "Section 4.1.2. !(c)(2) provided that the vehicle must
meet these frontal crash protection requirements through the use of manual seat
belts. . . 'in addition to the means that require no action by the vehicle occupant."'
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provide automatic protection. '' 92  After testing, NHTSA further con-
cluded that depowering beyond a level of twenty-five to thirty percent
would "produce little additional benefit for children, and markedly in-
creased risk for larger occupants."'
193
Former United States Senator Dirk Kempthorne (R-ID), a key propo-
nent of the moratorium on testing with unbelted dummies, argues that
air bag test requirements were developed and later mandated at a time
when few Americans wore seat belts. 194 Even though air bags were de-
scribed as "supplemental restraint systems" to be used in conjunction
with safety belts, they were largely designed to protect unbelted occu-
pants. 95 The Chairman of the National Transportation Safety Board
endorses this view, commenting that "[a]ir bag regulatory standards,
based on unrestrained occupants, are no longer appropriate.' 96
Safety and consumer groups, however, believe the unbelted crash test
requirement is not the problem. 97 These groups contend that the stan-
dard currently does not prohibit auto makers from making a bag with
less power.19s Under FMVSS 208, auto makers have the capabilities to
comply with the standard and make "a bag that has a lot of power when
it is needed, for an adult, and less power when it's not needed, for a
child . .."199
At the time of this Note's publication, NHTSA had not yet issued a
final rule on this petition. This is most likely because the Agency's pre-
ferred solution in alleviating the air bag crisis is through mandating
smart air bags, and not through changing test requirements. 200 A discus-
sion of the unbelted test requirement is nonetheless necessary because a
key area of disagreement between the auto industry and NHITSA over
192. Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards; Occupant Crash Protection, 62
Fed. Reg. at 8,920.
193. Id.
194. See id. at 8,918. In 1984, 14% of Americans were wearing seat belts, but
by 1991, seat belt use increased to 59% (largely due to increase in state legislation
requiring seat belts) and has increased to a 68% usage rate today. See id at 8,917-
18.
195. See id at 8,917.
196. Id. at 8,919.
197. See Air Bag Deactivation, 62 Fed. Reg. at 12,963.
198. See THE AIR BAG CRISIS, supra note 3, at 40.
199. Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards; Occupant Crash Protection, 62
Fed. Reg. at 8,919.
200. See infra Parts II.E.I and II.E.2.
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Ahe Agency's newest proposed rule is keeping the unbelted test require-
ment.
201
2. Eliminating the Unbelted Test Would Dramatically Reduce the
Benefits of Air Bags for Adults
Many compelling policy reasons dictate that the unbelted test re-
quirement should be eliminated.0 2 First, maintaining a safety standard
that permits air bag testing and design to be based on an amount of force
necessary to restrain an unbelted occupant is inherently unwise when
such force may be fatal to children and others who comply with seat belt
laws.20 3 Although it is disputed whether the current standard results in
overly forceful deployment rates, if the unbelted test requirement is, in
fact, contributing to the air bag crisis, the standard must be assessed and
amended immediately. Second, the need for an unbelted dummy may be
obsolete as the increase in national belt use continues to rise.20 4 Third,
the safety of those obeying the laws by wearing seat belts is considered
secondary to the safety of those who refuseto buckle-up.20 5 Therefore,
because air bags are intended to be a supplemental safety device, the test
crash should be optimized to protect belted occupants.
While the request appears well-reasoned, several arguments advanced
in the moratorium petition are problematic. First, the unbelted test re-
quirement does not mandate the particular air bag design's that are caus-
ing deaths in low speed crashes.20 6 Several air bag types have the ability
to prevent deaths in low speed crashes "while preserving the ability of
air bags to protect occupants in higher speed crashes., 20 7 These methods
201. See infra Part II.E. and text accompanying note 217 and 218.
202. See 62 Fed. Reg. at 8,920 (framing issues involved in debate on whether to
eliminate the unbelted test requirement).
203. See id.
204. See Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard; Occupant Crash Protection, 63
Fed. Reg. 49,958, 50,019 n.26 (1998) (to be codified at 49 C.F.R. pts. 571, 585,
587, & 595). "The National Occupant Protection Use Survey reported in August
1997 that young adults (16-24 years old) were observed with the lowest belt use
rate (less than 50%) of any of the reported observed categories." Id
205. See 62 Fed. Reg. at 8,920.
206. See THE AIR BAG CRISIS, supra note 3, at 87.
207. Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards; Occupant Crash Protection, 62
Fed. Reg. at 8,920. (These air bag types include dual-level inflators, higher de-
ployment thresholds, and smart air bags).
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are already available to auto makers under the standard. 208 Also, even
though sixty-eight percent of vehicle occupants wear seat belts, many
drivers and front seat occupants involved in fatal crashes do not wear
safety belts. 20 9 For unbelted drivers, the air bag is their primary means
of protection.
NHTSA must be cautious in allowing the depowering of air bags. The
Agency accurately recognizes that further depowering will thwart the
purpose of air bags. It is therefore unwise for the Agency to promulgate
a rule that will inevitably cause serious safety risks to adults to compen-
sate for the safety risks to children.210 This would be, in effect, reaching
a stage of diminishing returns with auto safety and is something NHTSA
should not consider.
E. The Proposed Rulemaking on Requiring Advanced Air Bags
1. The Agency's Newest NPRM and Request for Comments
The most recent addition to NHTSA's comprehensive air bag plan
occurred on September 18, 1998,211 and is a step in the right direction in
effectively ending the air bag crisis. In 1998, with the passage of the
NHTSA Reauthorization Act, Congress mandated that the Agency issue
208. See Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards; Occupant Crash Protection,
63 Fed. Reg. at 49,963 (explaining that the existing provisions of FMVSS 208
make no specifications as to the design of air bags, therefore, auto manufacturers
are encouraged to use more advanced means of meeting the performance require-
ments). "Although Standard No. 208 permits vehicle manufacturers to install air
bags incorporating advanced features, very few current air bags do so. Instead,
vehicle manufacturers have thus far used designs that inflate with the same force
under all circumstances." Id. at 49,963.
209. Fifty percent of drivers involved in fatal crashes' were not wearing their
safety belts. See 62 Fed. Reg. at 8,918.
210. In a letter to former Senator Dirk Kempthome (R-ID) dated January 13,
1997, NHTSA stated:
Our research indicate[s] that depowering air bags in the range of 20-
35 percent would reduce the risk to children without significantly
increasing the risk that the bags would be too weak to protect occu-
pants in high-speed crashes. Our tests indicat[e] that depowering
beyond that level produced little additional benefit for children, and
markedly increased the risk for larger occupants.
Id. at 8,920.
211. See Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard; Occupant Crash Protection, 63
Fed. Reg. 49,958 (1998) (to be codified at 49 C.F.R. pts. 571, 585, 587, & 595).
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a final rule on advanced air bags.21 2 Consistent with this mandate,
NHTSA proposes three critical changes in air bag design and testing.
First, the Agency proposes to upgrade FMVSS 208 by adding a new
set of performance requirements that includes testing dummies repre-
senting a twelve-month-old, a three-year-old, and a six-year-old child,
as well as using 5th percentile adult female dummies. 213 Second, in an
effort to ensure that air bags protect a "broader array of vehicle occu-
pants," NHTSA proposes additional testing requirements using both
belted and unbelted dummies.214 Third, NHTSA is also proposing to add
a "deformable barrier crash test, representing a relatively 'soft' pulse
crash, 21 5 that moderates the existing rigid barrier test.21 6 Auto manu-
facturers are adverse to a portion of the measure that requires a phasing
out of the sled test option and manual cut-off switches. 217 Opponents of
the rule consider a return to the tull-barrier test a step backwards in
ending the crisis.
21 8
The Agency has requested comments on numerous options in air bag
performance testing requirements. 219 For instance, the Agency proposes
options that would test the performance of systems designed to either
suppress air bag deployment in the presence of children and out-of-
212. See Transportation Equity Act for the 21st Century, Pub. L. No. 105-178,
112 Stat. 107, 323 (1998). The NHTSA Reauthorization Act directs the Agency to
issue the final rule not later than September 1, 1999. See Federal Motor Vehicle
Safety Standard; Occupant Crash Protection, 63 Fed. Reg. at 49,961.
213. See 63 Fed. Reg. at 49,960.
214. See id
215. See id. at 49,958. In describing the utility of such a test, NHTSA states:
In relatively 'soft' pulse crashes, some current air bags do not de-
ploy until after the occupants have moved so far forward that they
are near the air bag cover when deployment begins. Such 'late de-
ployments' lead to high risks of injury. This proposed new crash
test requirement is intended to ensure that air bag systems are de-
signed so that the air bag deploys earlier, before normally seated oc-




217. See id at 49,961. ("[T]he agency is proposing to amend FMVSS 208 so
that both the sled test option and manual cut-off switch provision are phased out as
the new requirements for advanced air bags are phased in.").
218. See Rebecca Porter, NHTSA Proposes Advanced Air Bag Requirement by
2006, TRIAL (Jan. 1999) ("Auto manufacturers... say this type of unbelted occu-
pant test resulted in the first-generation air bags that were too powerful.").
219. See 63 Fed. Reg. at 49,979-82.
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position occupants to ensure air bags avoid causing injury, or to test
requirements for low risk deployment, involving deployment of the air
bag in the presence of a twelve-month-old Crash Restraints Air Bag In-
teraction dummy in a rear-facing child restraint. 220 The proposed rule
attempts to amend FMVSS 208 so that installation of advanced air bags
will be required in some new cars and light trucks beginning on Sep-
tember 1, 2002, and in all new cars and light trucks beginning on Sep-
tember 1, 2005.221 It is possible then, that at the advent of the new mil-
lenium, air bag deaths and injuries will be a thing of the past.
2. Why the Smart Air Bag Rule Makes Sense
Currently, the only required testing for air bags is a thirty mile per
hour barrier crash or optional sled test, which does not destroy the vehi-
cle, both tests using an average size (50th percentile) male dummy. 22 By
contrast, the air bag performance requirements set forth in the proposed
rulemaking test "real world" crash conditions, which were not included
in the original FMVSS 208. That is, the proposed family of dummies,
with improved injury criteria, better represents human tolerances. Be-
cause the family includes a one-year-old, three-year-old, and six-year-
old dummy, as well as a small female and average size male dummy, the
air bag proposal will reduce the risks to infants, children, and out-of-
position occupants. The proposal's inclusion of full car crash tests will
also preserve and enhance the current level of air bag protection.
While the Agency's failure to act earlier this decade unnecessarily
contributed to air bag deaths and injuries,223 the Agency's. newest pro-
posal marks the beginning of the end of the air bag crisis. Indeed, re-
quiring auto makers to install air bags that have advanced technology
will lead to a rapid decline in the number of air bag fatalities, as well as
220. See Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard; Occupant Crash Protection, 63
Fed. Reg. at 49,973.
221. The implementation schedule for the advanced air bag phase-in is proposed
as follows:
25% of each manufacturer's light vehicles manufactured during the
production year beginning September 1, 2002;
40% of each manufacturer's light vehicles manufactured during the
production year beginning September 1, 2003;
70% of each manufacturer's light vehicles manufactured during the
production year beginning September 1, 2004;
100% of vehicles manufactured on or after September 1, 2005.
Id. at 49,977.
222. See supra discussion Parts I & 1I and text accompanying notes 51 and 65.
223. See THE AIR BAG CRISIS, supra note 3, at 117.
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I decrease in the number of risks air bags pose to out-of-position occu-
pants. The rule puts an end to the "one-size-fits-all" air bag and man-
dates air bags which recognize the weight, size, and or location of the
vehicle occupant. 24 If the Agency is serious about combating one of the
most serious risk factors of air bag injury, this proposal should be
adopted as a final rule. Ironically, however, the long term solution was
promulgated by NHTSA only after a mandate from Congress requiring
advanced air bags. 25
III. RESOLVING THE AIR BAG CRISIS: AN END IN SIGHT?
The federal air bag mandate was approximately thirty years in com-
ing. What began in 1970 as a passive restraint rule to protect vehicle
occupants from car collisions had its culmination in 1993, with a federal
requirement of dual-side air bags in all vehicles.2 26 These changes, fully
implemented by September 1997, were amended even before they be-
came effective.227 In tracing the origins of this impending air bag crisis,
NHTSA and the auto industry, in the midst of their regulatory bickering,
were the sole sources of this disaster.
The fatalities caused by air bags were avoidable. The auto industry
developed air bag systems two decades earlier that were safe for out-of-
position occupants.228 The Agency was also aware of air bag designs
that were proven to be harmful or deadly. Sadly, this information was
not considered in the eventual installation of air bags in the 1990s. In an
effort to provide maximum flexibility for the auto industry, NHTSA
failed at its most core function, to protect the American people from
unsafe auto features.
The problem with most of the Agency's recent air bag regulations is
they are remedial rather than preventive measures. The labeling re-
quirements, only now, adequately warn parents of the possible injuries
to children. The country, however, is nearing the end of the decade
where dozens of people were not warned and millions of others may be
at risk. The depowering of air bags likewise is a measure that may in-
crease risks to unbelted occupants and adults and could also render the
system's safety features ineffective in high speed collisions. While the
224. See 63 Fed. Reg. at 49,959.
225. See id at 49,961; infra text accompanying note 229.
226. See 49 C.F.R. § 571.208 (1996) and discussion supra Part II.
227. See 58 Fed. Reg. 46,551 (1993) and discussion supra Parts I & II.A.1.
228. See discussion supra Part I & text accompanying notes 69-75.
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more recent rule permitting on-off switches for air bags may decrease
the risk of fatalities and injuries, it is hardly a satisfactory solution.
Consumers should be provided with safe, well-designed air bags, not the
choice of whether to sit in front of a dangerous system or turn it off.
The latest proposal on requiring advanced air bags, however, is a
marked shift from the earlier measures. It is the one, single most effec-
tive measure taken by the Agency to reduce air bag fatalities. As such,
NHTSA should promulgate the rule as final by the end of this year.
NHTSA's responsibility to the nation remains three-fold: 1) to disal-
low further installation of unsafe air bag design systems, 2) to require
the auto industry to notify owners of vehicles with such design systems,
and 3) to actively encourage the introduction of smart air bag technol-
ogy229 into the automotive industry. 230 Poorly designed systems, then,
will no longer be able to slip through the cracks and onto our streets.
Pursuing these objectives would certainly at least allay the rising death
toll caused by air bags.
2 31
Lauren Pacelli
229. In 1998, Congress passed the NHTSA Reauthorization Act which man-
dated that NHTSA issue a final rule requiring smart air bag technology. See
Transportation Equity Act for the 21st Century, Pub. L. No. 105-178, 112 Stat.
107,323 (1998). With the push of the recent NHTSA proposed rule on requiring
advanced air bags, car companies appear to be taking initiative in developing
"smart" air bag technology. See Ford, GM Announce New Child Safety Plans (vis-
ited Feb. 12, 1999) <http://www.cnn.com/US/9902/1 1/ford.gm.safety/> (reporting
on GM's announcement that it will introduce an air bag system in 2000 that will be
capable of detecting whether the occupant in the front passenger seat is a small
adult or child); Ford to Offer Side Air Bags on All Models (visited Feb. 18, 1999)
<http://www.cnn.com/US/9804/08/ford.side.airbags/> (discussing new innovations
in air bag technology including side air bags for protection in side-impact colli-
sions); Government Sets Standards for Head Air Bags (visited Feb. 18, 1999)
<http://www.cnn.com/US/9807/30/new.air.bags/index.html> (describing BMW
and Mercedes-Benz "sausage-shaped" air bags for head protection being offered
with 1999 model sedans); Route 97: Airbag Deaths Spur Search for Improvements
(visited Feb. 18, 1999) <http://www.cnn.com/TECH/9701/13/route.97/index.html>
(discussing developing technologies for knee air bags and "curtain" air bags, those
that deploy in the front and rear sections of a car if it rolls over).
230, See THE AIR BAG CRISIS, supra note 3, at 170.
231. Alarmingly, recent reports have surfaced describing risks posed to chil-
dren by side-impact air bags. See Cindy Skrzycki, Regulators to Examine
Risks Posed to Children by Side-Impact Air Bags, WASH. POST, April 16, 1999,
at A7.
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